Speeding For An Emergency? Not So Fast...

Does the unforeseeable and unexpected shooting of someone in your motor vehicle and the need to transport him/her to the hospital immediately create a “sudden emergency?”

A recent Michigan Court of Appeals decision held that there remained a genuine issue of material fact concerning the applicability of the sudden-emergency doctrine in such situations.

In Salem v Saleh, the plaintiff was a backseat passenger in a car being driven by the defendant. The defendant’s car was leaving a drag-racing area at night when a fellow passenger was shot. The group made the decision to drive directly to the hospital. Estimates of the car’s speed varied between 90 and 160 miles per hour. When the defendant’s car got within 300 feet of the hospital, it hit a pothole and rolled over eight to 10 times.

The defendant argued that any negligence he committed should be excused, because he was responding to a medical emergency and speeding to the hospital to try to save the decedent’s life. The trial court agreed, stating: “[I]f there’s any case, the poster child, if you will, for sudden emergency, it’s this case.” 

On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court erroneously applied the sudden emergency-doctrine.   

The Michigan Court of Appeals noted that the sudden emergency doctrine excuses negligent conduct because of an emergency that requires an immediate response. The doctrine does not apply, however, when the sudden emergency is brought about by a defendant’s own negligence.

The court held that “a rational jury could determine that defendant acted reasonably and prudently.” On the other hand, the court noted, “a rational jury could determine that despite being face with a sudden emergency, defendant acted unreasonably by exceeding the speed limit to such a great extent, especially at nighttime with limited sight distances.” 

The dissent found that the defendant acted reasonably under the circumstances, noting:  “After he learned the decedent had been shot, defendant found the passenger ‘in danger,’ and was required to act in the chaotic moments that ensued - with the encouragement of his companions, including plaintiff - without time to consider what might have been better means to avoid the impending danger.”

The appellate court’s ability to see how juries might struggle with the “need for speed” argument in emergency cases like this one, makes such defenses precarious at best.

Share: Twitter Facebook LinkedIn Email

Add a comment

Type the following characters: hotel, papa, hotel, papa

* Indicates a required field.

Topics

Recent Updates

Plunkett Cooney Blogs

Plunkett Cooney Cookie Preference Center

Your Privacy

When you visit our website, we use cookies on your browser to collect information. The information collected might relate to you, your preferences, or your device, and is mostly used to make the site work as you expect it to and to provide a more personalized web experience. For more information about how we use Cookies, please see our Privacy Policy.

Strictly Necessary Cookies

Always Active

Necessary cookies enable core functionality such as security, network management, and accessibility. These cookies may only be disabled by changing your browser settings, but this may affect how the website functions.

Functional Cookies

Always Active

Some functions of the site require remembering user choices, for example your cookie preference, or keyword search highlighting. These do not store any personal information.

Form Submissions

Always Active

When submitting your data, for example on a contact form or event registration, a cookie might be used to monitor the state of your submission across pages.

Performance Cookies

Performance cookies help us improve our website by collecting and reporting information on its usage. We access and process information from these cookies at an aggregate level.

Powered by Firmseek