Don't Bet the Business

If you've ever wondered what happens when someone unknowingly buys a property that was stolen through a forged deed and then pours money into fixing it up, a recent decision from the Michigan Court of Appeals offers important guidance.  

In Toure v. Davis, No. 372918 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2026), the appellate court tackled a question that sits at the intersection of real estate fraud, quiet title actions and fundamental fairness —  can a party that acquired property through a chain of title originating in a forgery still claim reimbursement for improvements they made to that property?

The Facts: A Forged Deed and a Chain of Innocent Buyers

The story begins in May 2016, when Vamara Toure purchased a property in Wayne County, Michigan.  Toure's primary residence was in New York, and it was not until April 2018 — nearly two years later — that he traveled to Michigan and discovered someone else was living in his property.

What had happened in the meantime was brazen.  A woman named Micah Davis had forged a deed purporting to transfer the property from Toure to herself. A notary falsely represented that Toure had been present for the transaction. Davis then sold the property to Detroit International Holdings LLC, which subsequently transferred it to Koperfield Investments 2 LLC.  

Toure filed suit, seeking to have the forged deed — and all subsequent deeds flowing from it — declared void ab initio and removed from the chain of title, and to recover damages from Davis. The trial court granted a default judgment against Davis and quieted title in Toure's favor. The court also dismissed Detroit International and Koperfield as parties, reasoning they lacked "privity of contract" with Toure.

The Legal Issue: Can a Party Denied Title Still Claim for Improvements?

Here is where things get interesting. After the trial court found that Toure held title to the property, Detroit International and Koperfield wanted to file a claim under Michigan Court Rule 3.411(F)(1) for the value of improvements they had made to the property while they believed they owned it. The trial court refused, holding that because Detroit International and Koperfield had no privity of contract with Toure, they could not maintain such a claim. The court suggested they could instead "sue Micah Davis." Detroit International and Koperfield appealed.

Michigan Court of Appeals' Ruling: The Plain Language Wins

The appellate court, issuing a straightforward analysis rooted in the plain language of MCR 3.411(F)(1), which provides:

Within 28 days after the finding of title, a party may file a claim against the party found to have title to the premises for the amount that the present value of the premises has been increased by the erection of buildings or the making of improvements by the party making the claim or those through whom he or she claims.

The appellate court observed that nowhere in this rule is there any requirement that the claimant be in privity of contract with the title holder. The rule simply requires that the person filing the claim be "a party" to the quiet title action, which Detroit International and Koperfield undeniably were, and that the claim be brought against "the party found to have title to the premises," which was Toure.

The court also rejected the trial court's suggestion that Detroit International and Koperfield should instead sue Davis, noting that the court rule does not require the claim for improvements to be brought against a party's immediate predecessor in interest. Likewise, the trial court's reasoning that Detroit International and Koperfield needed to have some title or interest in the property to bring the claim was erroneous, because the rule "expressly contemplates that someone without title may claim the value of improvements made to the property."

What About Bad Faith?

Toure also raised MCR 3.411(F)(3), which bars recovery for improvements "made in bad faith." The appellate court acknowledged the rule but declined to apply it, instead noting that whether the improvements were made in bad faith was irrelevant to the threshold question of whether Detroit International and Koperfield could even bring a claim. Importantly, the appellate court pointed out that there was nothing in the record suggesting that Detroit International and Koperfield knew Davis's claim to the property was based on a forged deed, nor any evidence that they were aware of any cloud on their title when the improvements were made. Without evidence of bad faith, it was premature to preclude the claim.

Why This Case Matters Going Forward

While the decision is unpublished, it carries practical significance for several reasons.

First, it reinforces that Michigan courts will apply the plain language of MCR 3.411(F)(1) without grafting on additional requirements like privity of contract. For legal and real estate practitioners, this means that any "party" in a quiet title action can seek reimbursement for the value of improvements, regardless of their contractual relationship (or lack thereof) with the title holder.

Second, the decision provides a measure of protection for good-faith purchasers caught up in real estate fraud. When a forged deed sets off a chain of transactions, the downstream buyers who invest in the property are not necessarily left empty-handed after title is restored to the true owner. They may still have a viable claim for the increased value their improvements brought to the property.

Third, the appellate court's treatment of the bad faith defense under MCR 3.411(F)(3) is noteworthy. By separating the threshold right to bring a claim from the ultimate merits question of bad faith, the appellate court signals that trial courts should not conflate standing to file an improvement claim with the substantive defense that could defeat it. That is a procedural distinction that could matter in future cases.

Finally, the case serves as a cautionary tale about real estate fraud and the importance of due diligence. Forged deeds can create cascading consequences that affect not only the true owner, but also innocent third parties who invest in the property in good faith. As property fraud continues to be a concern, particularly with absentee owners, Toure v. Davis offers a useful framework for thinking about how courts should balance the rights of the true owner against the equitable interests of good-faith improvers.